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Output Costs of Currency Crises: 
Shocks, Policies and Cycles 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies output declines during currency crises based on the theoretical 
model by Nakatani (2016, 2017a), highlighting the role of shocks that trigger crises. 
Using panel data on 49 developing countries, we find that both productivity shocks 
in the real sector and shocks to the country’s risk premium in financial markets 
affect the output costs of currency crises, which are 4% of GDP on average and 8% 
for severe crises. During severe currency crises in Asian and Latin-American 
countries, both productivity shocks and exchange rate overvaluation were found to 
be important factors in explaining large output losses. 
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1 Introduction 
After the recent global financial crisis, the effects of financial crises on output growth 
have attracted more attention from researchers (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2017; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2013). In this paper, we analyze the output costs of a currency crisis, which is one 
type of financial crisis that has frequently occurred since the 1970s (Laeven and Valenica, 
2014). Many empirical studies on the output costs of currency crises have focused on the 
recovery from output declines or medium-term and long-term output losses, but no literature 
has cast a spotlight on the sources of shocks that led to the crises. Against this backdrop, it 
would be interesting to understand the sources of shocks that led to currency crises. Our 
research contributes to the literature by focusing on shocks that can lead to currency crises. 
Although economic theories predict that different types of shocks can trigger currency crises, 
only empirical analysis can quantify the different effects of each shock on output, and this has 
not been previously analyzed. For example, Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) developed a 
theoretical model in which an external shock in the international financial markets increases a 
country’s risk premium, which in turn worsens the balance sheets of firms and leads to a 
currency crisis. Another model developed by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) shows that 
a production shock can cause a currency crisis that is induced by liquidity problems under 
binding international and domestic collateral constraints. Nakatani (2016, 2017a) developed a 
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model in which both financial shocks and productivity shocks can trigger currency crises 
through the deteriorating balance sheets of firms and banks. Therefore, it is also interesting to 
connect the theories to empirical studies by focusing on the roles of shocks during currency 
crises. 
Recently, Nakatani (2017bc, 2018) used Nakatani’s (2016, 2017a) model to empirically 
analyze the effects of different shocks on exchange rates and the probability of a currency 
crisis. This model has several advantages. It can well explain currency crises occurring in 
countries with foreign currency debt, it can be applied to both fixed exchange rate regimes 
and flexible exchange rate regimes, and it can study the effects of several types of shocks and 
analyze the possibility of multiple equilibria. Following the theory, Nakatani (2017bc, 2018) 
focused on two types of shocks, including shocks to a country’s risk premium in the financial 
markets and productivity shocks in the real sector. He found that both shocks significantly 
affect exchange rate dynamics and the probability of a currency crisis. Furthermore, the 
model well explains past major currency crises in Asian and Latin-American countries. 
Specifically, the Nakatani (2016, 2017a) model shows that the equilibrium is determined by 
the intersection of two curves that simultaneously determine the exchange rate and output. 
Thus, it is natural to analyze the effects of shocks to both exchange rates and output. 
Although Nakatani (2017b) analyzed the effects of shocks on exchange rates and Nakatani 
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(2017c, 2018) analyzed their effects on the probability of a currency crisis (from the 
viewpoint of multiple equilibria), no literature has analyzed the effects on output. In this 
regard, we empirically analyze the effects of the aforementioned two shocks on output by 
applying the data and estimation methods developed by Nakatani (2017bc, 2018). 
Using unbalanced panel data on 49 emerging markets and developing countries from 
1980 to 2011, we examine different definitions of currency crises, including the ‘standard’ 
currency crisis and the ‘severe’ currency crisis. Our results show that the output costs of a 
currency crisis is approximately 4% on average and approximately 8% for a severe crisis. We 
also find that although both types of shocks affect output dynamics, the sizes of their effects 
are different. Namely, productivity shocks appear to be more important for output declines 
during past famous currency crises that occurred in emerging markets. By contrast, risk 
premium shocks amplify the output costs during currency crisis periods, but the size of this 
effect was very small during the past selected emerging market crises. In addition to 
productivity shocks, we found that business cycles and the economic adjustments associated 
with overvalued exchange rates also had large effects on output declines during past major 
currency crises in Asia and Latin America. 
The organizational structure of this paper includes a review of the literature in which we 
briefly summarize and discuss the empirical literature on the output costs of currency crises 
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and the theoretical literature on generational currency crisis models. Then, we explain the 
methodology and data used in this article and discuss our empirical results and their 
implications for past emerging market crises. Finally, we conclude the work. 
 
2 Literature Review 
The empirical literature on currency crises has tried to measure output losses during the 
crises. Using a panel data set of 24 emerging-market economies covering the 1975–1997 
period, Hutchison and Noy (2002, 2005) found that currency crises reduce output by 
approximately 5–8%, whereas Hutchison and Noy (2006) found a 2–3% reduction. Bordo, 
Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001) found that the average output loss from 
currency crises was approximately 6% for 56 sample countries over the period from 1973–
1997. Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2007) considered currency crises that occurred in 91 
developing countries during the period from 1970–2000 and found that the average 
contractionary effect of currency crises on output was approximately 5%. Recently, Basistha 
and Teimouri (2015) found that output declined by an average of 4% during currency crises 
between 1970 and 2005. Other studies focused on output recovery after currency crises or 
medium-term output losses (Hong and Tornell, 2005; Cerra and Saxena, 2008; Bussière, 
Saxena and Tovar, 2012; Wan and Jin, 2014; Teimouri and Brooks, 2015). 
 7 
Theoretical currency crisis models show the various factors that can lead to crises, 
including inconsistencies among fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies (1st-generation 
model of Krugman, 1979), the expectation of investors (2nd-generation model of Obstfeld, 
1996), and financial frictions (3rd-generation model
1
) such as the foreign currency 
denominated debt of firms (Nakatani, 2017a) or commercial banks (Nakatani, 2016). In this 
study, in addition to macroeconomic policies such as monetary and fiscal policies, financial 
and/or real shocks trigger currency crises and reduce output (the mechanism through which 
shocks transmit to the real economy is explained in the next section). Recently, a new type of 
balance of payments crisis model (4th-generation model) was developed by Nakatani (2017d) 
in which a negative commodity price shock leads to a balance of payments crisis in a 
resource-rich economy. 
Despite a growing number of empirical studies, there is still a missing link between 
theoretical models and empirical analyses on currency crises. For example, it is theoretically 
assumed that a shock can lead to currency crises. However, no empirical research has 
analyzed the effects of shocks on currency crises except for Nakatani (2017bc, 2018). 
Nakatani (2017b) empirically analyzed the effects of real and financial shocks on exchange 
rates, and Nakatani (2017c, 2018) studied the effects of these shocks on the probability of a 
currency crisis. However, the literature has never studied the effects of the shocks on output 
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during the crises. Against this background, this paper analyzes the effects of shocks on output 
during currency crises by applying the method developed by Nakatani (2017bc, 2018). The 
details of the methodology are explained in the next section. 
 
3 Methodology and Data 
Following Nakatani (2017bc, 2018), we use Nakatani’s (2017a) model to analyze the 
effects of shocks during currency crises. Several merits of this model were emphasized in the 
introduction. The model shows that output and the nominal exchange rate are determined by 
the intersection of two curves: the Interest-Parity-LM (IPLM) curve and the Wealth curve. 
These curves are depicted in two dimensions: the output on the horizontal axis and the 
nominal exchange rate on the vertical axis. 
The IPLM curve is a downward-sloping, convex curve characterized by the money 
market equilibrium and central bank’s behavior. If there is a positive shock to the country’s 
risk premium, the IPLM curve shifts upward, and this can cause a currency crisis equilibrium. 
The economic intuition is that the abrupt deterioration in investors’ perception about a 
country’s gross foreign debt can lead to an increase in the country’s risk premium. This in 
turn depreciates the national currency because of the interest parity condition. A depreciation 
of domestic currency leads to an increase in the debt burden denominated in foreign currency, 
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which in turn lowers the output via reduced investment if the country has a large foreign 
currency debt. By contrast, if the country has a large export sector, the currency depreciation 
increases export revenues, which boosts output. Therefore, it is not clear whether the risk 
premium shock can theoretically decrease or increase output. Thus, it is a pure empirical 
issue to test the effects. 
On the other hand, the Wealth curve is characterized by the behavior of firms. It is also 
downward sloping but concave. The model predicts that if there is a negative productivity 
shock, the Wealth curve shifts to the left, which may also generate a currency crisis 
equilibrium. A relevant economic intuition is that the unanticipated negative productivity 
shock reduces output, profits, retained earnings, net worth and investments of the firms and 
results in extremely low output and a corresponding lower need for money (i.e., depreciation 
of the domestic currency) in the next period. 
Thus, in our empirical analysis, the main explanatory variables are these two shocks (the 
shock to the country’s risk premium and the productivity shock). In addition to these two 
shocks, we also include monetary policy and fiscal policy variables among the explanatory 
variables because macroeconomic policies can also affect output. The regression equation 
that determines the relationship between the shocks and output is defined as: 
tititititititi CrisisWshockIPLMshockgiyy ,6,5,4,3,21,10,     
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tititititi ZshockWCrisisIPLMshockCrisis ,9,,8,,7 )()(   ti,     
where 
tiy , is growth of real GDP for the i th country at time t ; tii ,  is the interest rate policy 
(the change in the policy interest rate); 
tig , is the fiscal policy measured by the budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP; 
tiIPLMshock ,  is the change in the country’s risk premium 
that shifts the IPLM curve
2
; 
tiWshock ,  is the productivity shock that shifts the Wealth curve
3
; 
tiCrisis ,  is a dummy variable equal to unity if the country has a currency crisis and zero 
otherwise; 
tiZ , is the control variables; and ti , is an error term. The lag of the GDP growth 
rate is included in the explanatory variable because GDP growth rates are highly persistent. 
The control variables include the change in the ratio of short-term external debt to GDP, the 
deviation of GDP growth
4
, the exchange rate overvaluation and the ratio of foreign reserves 
to imports. Most variables, such as real GDP and fiscal variables, are taken from the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook database. Nakatani (2014, 
2017b) includes the details, construction and sources of the data. The summary statistics for 
each variable are shown in Table 1. The interpretations of the coefficient for each explanatory 
variable are discussed in the next section. 
From the econometric perspective, a potential problem in this analysis arises from the 
possible endogeneity of policy and other variables. For example, if central banks determine 
policy interest rates after they observe some shocks that are not captured by the W-shock or 
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the IPLM-shock, the ordinary least squares estimation of the regression equation results in 
inconsistent estimators for all coefficients. To solve this problem, we use the instrumental 
variable method. We employ the lagged variable as an instrument because this variable 
appears to be both strongly correlated with the current policy variable and exogenous in the 
sense that it is predetermined before the shock occurs in the current period. Following 
Nakatani (2017b), we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step generalized method of 
moments estimator with the small sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) in our 
estimation because it is asymptotically efficient and robust to initial conditions and the 
distributions of the error term. Furthermore, we use a collapsing method developed by 
Roodman (2009) to avoid the problem of too many instruments generated by the moment 
conditions, which weakens the Hansen overidentification test (Bowsher, 2002). 
The sample in this study covers 49 emerging markets and developing countries from 
1980 to 2011 (Table 2).
5
 As in the case of Nakatani (2017b), the results of the panel unit root 
tests indicate that all variables are stationary at the 5% significance level. Currency crisis 
dates are determined by the exchange market pressure index, defined as a weighted average 
of the monthly real effective exchange rate depreciation percentage and the monthly 
international reserve losses percentage weighted such that the two components equal sample 
volatility (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Both monthly series are taken from the IMF’s 
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International Financial Statistics.
6
 We examine several definitions of currency crisis episodes 
because the definition may matter. A currency crisis year is defined as when the index 
exceeds the mean plus two country-specific standard deviations (with/without a 24-month 
window). A ‘severe currency crisis’ year is defined as the index exceeding the mean plus 
three country-specific standard deviations (with/without a 24-month window). 
 
4 Empirical Results 
The estimation results are presented in Tables 3–6. Table 3 is the estimation with the 
IPLM-shock, whereas Table 4 checks the effects of the W-shock. Table 5 is the result of the 
estimation that includes both types of shocks. Table 6 is a robustness check that controls for 
exchange rate regimes. In most results, the lagged GDP growth rates are positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, showing the inertial effects of output. The results for 
other explanatory variables are discussed below. 
As for policy variables, both coefficients on the interest rate policy and fiscal policy 
have the expected signs and are highly statistically significant in most specifications. For 
example, Tables 4-6 show that a 1 percentage point increase in the policy interest rate is 
associated with an approximately 0.2 percentage point lower output growth. The positive 
coefficient of the fiscal variable suggests that a good fiscal situation is associated with higher 
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economic growth. Regarding the reserve management policy, coefficients on the ratio of 
foreign reserves to imports are statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns of Tables 
3-4 and in the results for standard currency crises (columns (10), (13) and (14) in Tables 5-6). 
This variable captures a feature of the 1st-generation models, and it is consistent with their 
theories. The positive coefficient on the reserves-to-import ratio means that if a country does 
not have enough foreign reserves to cover imports, the shortage of foreign exchanges hinders 
economic activity and growth (Nakatani, 2017d). 
Next, we discuss one of the key results of this paper about the effects of two shocks on 
output. The results presented in Tables 3-6 show that the coefficients on both the IPLM-shock 
and the W-shock are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (in normal times 
without the interaction term of the crisis dummy) in all specifications. The IPLM-shock is 
positively correlated with output growth in normal times. This implies that the export channel 
is more important than the foreign currency debt channel in normal times. In other words, if 
there is an increase in a country’s risk premium, this leads to a depreciation of domestic 
currency, which in turn increases net exports, as was theoretically demonstrated by Nakatani 
(2017a). For instance, column (10) in Table 5 suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in 
the IPLM-shock is associated with an approximately 0.08 percentage point higher GDP 
growth. By contrast, the W-shock is positively correlated with output dynamics, and this is 
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also consistent with the theory. 
For the remainder of this paper, we discuss the results for the output costs of a currency 
crisis, which is our main topic of this paper. We can think of these costs as an output decline 
caused by an abrupt shift of the equilibrium from a good equilibrium with a high level of 
output to a crisis equilibrium with an extremely low output (Nakatani, 2016, 2017a). The 
coefficient of the currency crisis dummy is always negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level in all specifications in Tables 3-5 and at the 5% level in Table 6 except in the last 
column (16). We find that its size is different between the standard currency crisis definition 
and the severe crisis definition. For example, Table 5 shows that the output costs of currency 
crises are approximately 4–5% of GDP, whereas the costs are much larger at 7–8% for severe 
currency crises. Thus, we can conclude that the definition of a currency crisis matters for 
output costs. The countries that experience high pressure on their exchange rates and reserves 
(which is the definition of a severe currency crisis) have large output costs. These estimated 
output costs of currency crises are in line with the existing empirical studies discussed in the 
literature review section. 
Furthermore, this paper aims to capture the effects of each shock on output during 
currency crises. The interaction term of the currency crisis dummy with the IPLM-shock is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (3), (10), (13) and (14). This 
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supports the theory of a currency crisis in which a positive risk premium shock induces 
currency depreciation, thereby increasing the burden of foreign currency denominated debt , 
as shown by Nakatani’s (2016, 2017a) model. For example, column (10) of Table 5 implies 
that a 1 percentage point increase in the IPLM-shock is associated with a 0.04 percentage 
point lower output growth during the currency crisis period. Combined with the results of the 
positive coefficient on the IPLM-shock during normal times, we can conclude that the effects 
of the IPLM-shock are positive on output through increased net exports during tranquil times. 
However, the effects become negative during currency crises because the drastic depreciation 
of domestic currency increases the foreign currency debt burden and requires balance sheet 
adjustments. This implies that the negative balance sheet channel of currency depreciation 
dominates under the circumstance of dramatic currency depreciation, which comes from the 
valuation effect of debt denominated in foreign currency. Moreover, the positive export 
channel is limited because firms might face supply constraints and not be so quick to 
dramatically increase the production of export goods. We will calculate examples of the 
relative impacts of the IPLM-shock in the next section using the historical data from selected 
Asian and Latin-American currency crises. 
By contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term of the currency crisis dummy with 
the W-shock is always negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in all 
 16 
specifications in Tables 4-6. This is interesting because it implies that if the country has a 
negative productivity shock during currency crises, this shock lowers output as in normal 
times, although the effects are somewhat smaller during currency crises. However, we should 
note that the overall effect of W-shock is the sum of the coefficients on W-shock with and 
without the interaction term of the currency crisis. Thus, we will measure the output costs of 
currency crises by controlling for the source of shocks (i) using the average size of two 
shocks during crises in the next paragraph and (ii) by applying our results for past major 
emerging market crises in the next section. 
To precisely measure the output costs of currency crises, we need to calculate the total 
output losses of the crises using the three coefficients on the explanatory variables that 
include a currency crisis dummy. We multiply the coefficient of the interaction term of the 
currency crisis dummy with the W-shock presented in column (10) of Table 5 by the mean 
value of productivity shock during currency crises shown in Table 1. Thus, we find that the 
average productivity shock during the currency crisis period increases output costs by 0.14 
percentage points. The same procedure for the interaction term of the crisis dummy with the 
IPLM-shock shows that the IPLM-shock has an additional 0.14 percentage points amplifying 
effect on output costs. By combining these calculations with the coefficient on the currency 
crisis dummy variable in column (10) of Table 5, the total output costs for a standard 
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currency crisis is 4.2%. The same calculation based on column (12) of Table 5 yields that the 
output costs for a severe currency crisis are 7.9% due to the 0.38% amplifying effect from the 
IPLM-shock and 0.51% mitigating effect from the large negative W-shock. 
Finally, the estimated results for an important control variable can be discussed as 
follows. One of the key factors that has been analyzed in the 3rd-generation models of 
currency crises (including Nakatani’s (2016, 2017a) model) is short-term external debt. The 
coefficients on the change in short-term external debt to GDP ratio are always negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all tables. This means that an increase in external 
leverage is associated with a lower economic growth rate, which is consistent with the 
prediction of the 3rd-generation models of currency crises. 
For a robustness check, we conduct a further analytical exercise that considers exchange 
rate regimes. The sample country and period of the data in this paper include different 
exchange rate regimes because the Nakatani (2016, 2017a) model can analyze both a floating 
exchange rate regime and a pegged exchange rate regime. However, in practice, the effects of 
shocks and macroeconomic policy may differ across exchange rate regimes. Thus, here, we 
analyze these effects using a subset of data with comparable exchange rate regimes. As most 
of the data are floating exchange rate regimes, we show the results excluding pegged regimes. 
Following Klein and Shambaugh (2008), we use the exchange rate regime classification of 
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the IMF that is widely used in the literature. Table 6 shows the results based on the floating 
exchange rate regimes. The results shown in Table 6 suggest that the significance and the size 
of each coefficient do not substantially change from Table 5. The exception is that the output 
costs of a currency crisis are approximately 6% of GDP for floating exchange rate regimes 
and are slightly larger than the results of all samples in Table 4. This is consistent with the 
findings by Nakatani (2017c, 2018) that showed that floating exchange rate regimes are more 
vulnerable to shocks. Thus, we can conclude that the coefficients in the benchmark estimation 
are robust and not as sensitive to the cases when we consider exchange rate regimes. 
 
5 Applications for Emerging Market Crises 
From now, we analyze output declines during currency crises using the coefficients 
estimated in the previous section. We decompose the output declines observed during the 
selected currency crises in emerging markets into our explanatory variables in the regression 
to assess the nature of each currency crisis from the viewpoints of the three generational 
currency crisis models. We select five Asian and Latin-American countries that experienced 
well-known currency crises in the 1990s: Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia in 1997-98, 
Brazil in 1991 and Mexico in 1995. For the Asian crisis, it began in Thailand in 1997 and 
later spilled over to neighboring countries in 1998. Thus, we focus on the output declines in 
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1997 for Thailand and 1998 for the Philippines and Malaysia because the latter two countries 
experienced large output declines in 1998 rather than in 1997. We use the estimation results 
shown in column (10) of Table 5 for two reasons. First, this definition of a currency crisis is 
most commonly used in the literature. Second, all estimated coefficients in this specification 
are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Figure 1 shows the results of the decomposition of output declines into factors 
highlighted in the theoretical currency crisis models. In the figure, monetary policy (interest 
rate policy) and fiscal policy are aggregated as a “policy” category. In Figure 1, the “W-shock” 
(or the “IPLM-shock”) is combined with the effects from productivity shocks (or risk 
premium shocks), including the effects calculated from the coefficient on the W-shock (or the 
IPLM-shock) plus the coefficient on the interaction of the corresponding shock and currency 
crisis dummy. Output changes associated with exchange rate adjustments (i.e., the exchange 
rate overvaluation and the reserve-to-import ratio) are shown as “exchange rate” in Figure 1. 
Furthermore, deviations of the GDP growth and lagged GDP growth rates are categorized as 
“business cycle” in the figure. 
The overall picture shows that productivity shocks in the 3rd-generation models and the 
exchange rate overvaluation in the 2nd-generation models were important factors explaining 
output declines in these crisis episodes. For example, in Thailand, approximately half of the 
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output declines in 1997 were explained by the W-shock (the productivity shock). Other 
factors that contributed to the declines were business cycles and the output costs associated 
with the currency crisis (currency crisis dummy). For the Philippines and Malaysia, the main 
contributions to the output declines (starting with the most significant) were productivity 
shocks (which accounted for approximately one-third of the overall output decline), exchange 
rate overvaluation, and the cyclical factors of the economy. Note that our EMPI defines the 
currency crisis as occurring in 1997 for these two countries but not in 1998 if we use the 
24-month window. Hence, the output costs estimated by the crisis dummy are not included in 
the figure. By contrast, the Latin-American crises demonstrate that the main causes of output 
declines were features of the 2nd-generation models (such as the overvaluation of exchange 
rates), which is consistent with the literature (Nakatani, 2017b; Cole and Kehoe, 1996). In 
these countries, in addition to the W-shock and business cycle, the effects from fiscal policy 
also contributed to the output contraction because the countries experienced fiscal 
consolidation during the crisis periods. Our results are consistent with the findings by 
Nakatani (2017c, 2018) that showed that negative productivity shocks are key triggering 
factors for severe currency crises. 
What is most striking in our results is that although we observed statistically significant 
effects from the IPLM-shock, the impacts are very small in terms of output declines. This is a 
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stark contrast to the finding by Nakatani (2017b) that the effects of IPLM-shocks on 
exchange rates are sizable. Combining these results for the effects of the IPLM-shock on the 
exchange rate and output, our results imply that the curvature of the Wealth curve in 
Nakatani’s (2017a) model is steep because the shift of the IPLM curve has a large impact on 
the exchange rate but a small effect on output. As shown in Nakatani (2017a), this is the case 
when the economy has a large foreign currency denominated debt. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This article analyzed the output costs of currency crises based on the theoretical 
currency crisis model by Nakatani (2016, 2017a). Following this theory, we focused on two 
shocks: the IPLM-shocks and the W-shocks. Nakatani (2017a) showed that the IPLM-shock 
induces currency depreciation due to the interest parity condition, and its impact on output is 
purely an empirical question. This is because currency depreciation boosts net exports and 
increases the debt burden denominated in foreign currency. By contrast, the theory always 
predicts a positive relationship between the W-shock and output. The main contribution of 
this paper is to control, clarify and quantify the effects of these two shocks on output declines 
during currency crises. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we found that output costs are 
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approximately 4% of GDP for standard currency crises and 8% of GDP for severe currency 
crises after we control the effects of shocks. Second, we found that both the W-shocks and the 
IPLM-shocks can influence output dynamics, but their impacts are different. Namely, in 
terms of the size of output declines, the effects of the W-shocks are much larger than those of 
the IPLM-shocks. Third, we found an interesting contrast for the effects of the IPLM-shocks 
between normal periods and currency crisis periods. Specifically, the IPLM-shock increases 
the output during normal times but reduces output during crises. This implies that an export 
channel prevails in normal periods, while the balance sheet channel dominates during 
currency crisis periods. Fourth, applying our estimated coefficients on factors contributing to 
past prominent emerging market crises, we found that the W-shocks, exchange rate 
overvaluation, and business cycles are more important factors for output declines than the 
effects of macroeconomic policies. The results presented in Figure 1 agree with the orthodox 
view that features of the 3rd-generation models (i.e., productivity shocks) well explain Asian 
currency crises and those of the 2nd-generation models (i.e., overvalued exchange rates) 
explain Latin-American crises to a large extent. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
All Samples 
(Crisis Samples
1
) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP Growth  
9.03 
(1.37) 
14.66 
(18.53) 
-66.61 
(-66.61) 
69.31 
(54.11) 
Interest Rate Policy 
-0.64 
(3.01) 
16.22 
(13.23) 
-269.74 
(-23.25) 
244.35 
(88.00) 
Fiscal Policy 
-1.69 
(-3.07) 
4.25 
(4.96) 
-25.40 
(-25.40) 
32.83 
(7.47) 
IPLM-Shock 
-1.36 
(3.34) 
21.53 
(26.17) 
-270.49 
(-125.24) 
138.61 
(117.16) 
W-Shock 
0.71 
(0.19) 
4.15 
(4.69) 
-18.63 
(-11.65) 
21.77 
(14.89) 
Change in Short-term  
External Debt / GDP 
-0.10 
(-0.06) 
2.94 
(2.39) 
-25.34 
(-8.07) 
22.98 
(6.33) 
Deviation GDP Growth 
0.18 
(-0.11) 
3.75 
(4.74) 
-21.11 
(-14.59) 
18.03 
(18.03) 
Exchange Rate  
Overvaluation 
-0.32 
(2.26) 
9.30 
(17.27) 
-72.69 
(-25.17) 
116.01 
(116.01) 
Foreign Reserves / Imports 
0.61 
(0.47) 
0.49 
(0.32) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
4.04 
(1.59) 
1 
The summary statistics for samples classified as standard currency crises with a 24-month window are 
shown in parentheses. 
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Table 2: List of Countries 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guyana 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Macedonia 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Republic of the Philippines 
Romania 
Russia 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Togo 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
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Table 3: Estimation Results for the IPLM-Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Definition of Crisis Currency Crises 
Currency Crises 
with Window 
Severe Crises 
Severe Crises with 
Window 
Lagged GDP Growth  
0.133*** 
(0.018) 
0.145*** 
(0.014) 
0.131*** 
(0.014) 
0.137*** 
(0.020) 
Interest Rate Policy 
-0.063*** 
(0.017) 
-0.077*** 
(0.016) 
-0.309* 
(0.016) 
-0.060** 
(0.023) 
Fiscal Policy 
0.673*** 
(0.090) 
0.656*** 
(0.089) 
0.604*** 
(0.078) 
0.589*** 
(0.084) 
IPLM-Shock 
0.027*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
Currency Crisis 
-7.877*** 
(0.935) 
-5.862*** 
(1.073) 
-10.329*** 
(1.070) 
-11.110*** 
(1.004) 
Currency Crisis× 
IPLM-Shock 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.292*** 
(0.090) 
-0.092 
(0.062) 
Change in Short-term  
External Debt / GDP 
-0.463*** 
(0.103) 
-0.456*** 
(0.095) 
-0.377*** 
(0.100) 
-0.462*** 
(0.115) 
Deviation GDP Growth 
1.475*** 
(0.083) 
1.558*** 
(0.079) 
1.521*** 
(0.070) 
1.568*** 
(0.077) 
Exchange Rate  
Overvaluation 
0.196*** 
(0.029) 
0.210*** 
(0.030) 
0.205*** 
(0.024) 
0.227*** 
(0.025) 
Foreign Reserves / Imports 
1.796*** 
(0.474) 
2.203*** 
(0.577) 
2.190*** 
(0.552) 
2.341*** 
(0.568) 
Constant 
9.102*** 
(0.523) 
8.286*** 
(0.518) 
8.607*** 
(0.499) 
8.221*** 
(0.483) 
Number of Observations 600 600 600 600 
Number of Countries 46 46 46 46 
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(2) (p-value) 
0.419 0.370 0.376 0.427 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.080 0.087 0.110 0.106 
Significant at * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) levels. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 Table 4: Estimation Results for the W-Shock 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Definition of Crisis Currency Crises 
Currency Crises 
with Window 
Severe Crises 
Severe Crises with 
Window 
Lagged GDP Growth  
0.068*** 
(0.015) 
0.075*** 
(0.016) 
0.073*** 
(0.013) 
0.080*** 
(0.015) 
Interest Rate Policy 
-0.258*** 
(0.047) 
-0.230*** 
(0.036) 
-0.227*** 
(0.049) 
-0.222*** 
(0.036) 
Fiscal Policy 
0.426*** 
(0.042) 
0.430*** 
(0.043) 
0.375*** 
(0.065) 
0.370*** 
(0.060) 
W-Shock 
1.668*** 
(0.107) 
1.654*** 
(0.157) 
1.765*** 
(0.144) 
1.732*** 
(0.148) 
Currency Crisis 
-4.578*** 
(1.074) 
-4.378*** 
(1.111) 
-8.615*** 
(1.419) 
-9.396*** 
(1.298) 
Currency Crisis× 
W-Shock 
-0.583** 
(0.218) 
-1.075*** 
(0.208) 
-1.118*** 
(0.275) 
-1.468*** 
(0.197) 
Change in Short-term  
External Debt / GDP 
-0.460*** 
(0.134) 
-0.473*** 
(0.128) 
-0.490*** 
(0.133) 
-0.425*** 
(0.123) 
Deviation GDP Growth 
0.444*** 
(0.148) 
0.523*** 
(0.178) 
0.398*** 
(0.121) 
0.473*** 
(0.153) 
Exchange Rate  
Overvaluation 
0.812*** 
(0.045) 
0.808*** 
(0.046) 
0.810*** 
(0.050) 
0.801*** 
(0.052) 
Foreign Reserves / Imports 
3.224*** 
(0.969) 
2.571*** 
(0.685) 
2.125*** 
(0.669) 
2.257*** 
(0.494) 
Constant 
7.087*** 
(0.596) 
7.120*** 
(0.374) 
7.441*** 
(0.495) 
7.197*** 
(0.335) 
Number of Observations 510 510 510 510 
Number of Countries 35 35 35 35 
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(2) (p-value) 
0.334 0.242 0.140 0.122 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.149 0.128 0.134 0.157 
Significant at * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) levels. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Estimation Results for the IPLM-Shock and the W-Shock 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Definition of Crisis Currency Crises 
Currency Crises 
with Window 
Severe Crises 
Severe Crises with 
Window 
Lagged GDP Growth  
0.089* 
(0.045) 
0.092*** 
(0.023) 
0.127*** 
(0.037) 
0.123*** 
(0.034) 
Interest Rate Policy 
-0.214*** 
(0.049) 
-0.231*** 
(0.055) 
-0.173*** 
(0.055) 
-0.175*** 
(0.044) 
Fiscal Policy 
0.370*** 
(0.149) 
0.338*** 
(0.119) 
0.256** 
(0.112) 
0.259*** 
(0.107) 
IPLM-Shock 
0.071*** 
(0.016) 
0.076*** 
(0.014) 
0.065*** 
(0.016) 
0.061*** 
(0.014) 
W-Shock 
1.651*** 
(0.159) 
1.695*** 
(0.166) 
1.527*** 
(0.130) 
1.568*** 
(0.129) 
Currency Crisis 
-4.699*** 
(1.444) 
-3.888*** 
(1.598) 
-7.182*** 
(1.405) 
-7.985*** 
(1.532) 
Currency Crisis× 
IPLM-Shock 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.043** 
(0.020) 
-0.260 
(0.163) 
-0.131 
(0.099) 
Currency Crisis× 
W-Shock 
-0.564*** 
(0.378) 
-0.765*** 
(0.220) 
-1.446*** 
(0.382) 
-1.664*** 
(0.411) 
Change in Short-term  
External Debt / GDP 
-0.616*** 
(0.152) 
-0.648*** 
(0.076) 
-0.639*** 
(0.142) 
-0.683*** 
(0.133) 
Deviation GDP Growth 
0.496* 
(0.247) 
0.521** 
(0.198) 
0.736*** 
(0.186) 
0.706*** 
(0.185) 
Exchange Rate  
Overvaluation 
0.802*** 
(0.060) 
0.824*** 
(0.074) 
0.720*** 
(0.046) 
0.721*** 
(0.041) 
Foreign Reserves / Imports 
2.873 
(3.711) 
3.070*** 
(0.803) 
4.517 
(3.281) 
3.914 
(3.255) 
Constant 
7.328* 
(3.750) 
6.877*** 
(0.584) 
5.251 
(3.241) 
5.738* 
(3.143) 
Number of Observations 427 427 427 427 
Number of Countries 32 32 32 32 
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(2) (p-value) 
0.266 0.313 0.126 0.114 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.408 0.430 0.355 0.409 
Significant at * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) levels. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Robustness Check: Estimation Results for Floating Exchange Rate Regimes 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Definition of Crisis Currency Crises 
Currency Crises 
with Window 
Severe Crises 
Severe Crises with 
Window 
Lagged GDP Growth  
0.076*** 
(0.024) 
0.087*** 
(0.019) 
0.076*** 
(0.025) 
0.073*** 
(0.026) 
Interest Rate Policy 
-0.214*** 
(0.029) 
-0.214*** 
(0.033) 
-0.148*** 
(0.037) 
-0.145*** 
(0.035) 
Fiscal Policy 
0.318*** 
(0.105) 
0.279*** 
(0.098) 
0.295** 
(0.115) 
0.295** 
(0.112) 
IPLM-Shock 
0.071*** 
(0.006) 
0.073*** 
(0.007) 
0.049*** 
(0.014) 
0.039*** 
(0.012) 
W-Shock 
1.601*** 
(0.125) 
1.585*** 
(0.117) 
1.577*** 
(0.102) 
1.645*** 
(0.137) 
Currency Crisis 
-5.524*** 
(1.265) 
-5.699*** 
(1.366) 
-8.411** 
(4.096) 
-9.426* 
(4.840) 
Currency Crisis× 
IPLM-Shock 
-0.035*** 
(0.010) 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.155 
(0.177) 
-0.134 
(0.105) 
Currency Crisis× 
W-Shock 
-0.793*** 
(0.222) 
--0.834*** 
(0.213) 
-0.974*** 
(0.275) 
-1.285*** 
(0.299) 
Change in Short-term  
External Debt / GDP 
-0.693*** 
(0.110) 
-0.711*** 
(0.104) 
-0.546*** 
(0.090) 
-0.588*** 
(0.079) 
Deviation GDP Growth 
0.460*** 
(0.162) 
0.477*** 
(0.155) 
0.431*** 
(0.147) 
0.398** 
(0.170) 
Exchange Rate  
Overvaluation 
0.847*** 
(0.039) 
0.856*** 
(0.043) 
0.810*** 
(0.045) 
0.813*** 
(0.056) 
Foreign Reserves / Imports 
3.375*** 
(1.075) 
3.003*** 
(0.905) 
0.628 
(1.982) 
0.834 
(1.965) 
Constant 
6.980*** 
(0.614) 
6.877*** 
(0.559) 
9.103*** 
(1.811) 
8.845*** 
(1.780) 
Number of Observations 394 394 394 394 
Number of Countries 32 32 32 32 
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(2) (p-value) 
0.448 0.371 0.081 0.110 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.507 0.503 0.417 0.439 
Significant at * (10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%) levels. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Figure 1: Output Declines in Selected Currency Crises 
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Notes 
1 
Other types of 3rd-generation models include moral hazard caused by government 
guarantees (McKinnon and Pill, 1999; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999; Dooley, 
2000; Dekle and Kletzer, 2002; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2004; Schneider 
and Tornell, 2004, etc.), which is difficult to measure as a shock because it always takes 
several years for the over-borrowing syndrome to result in a crisis. 
2 
The IPLM-shock is identified by Nakatani (2017b) as an error term resulting from 
regressing the country’s risk premium (the interest rate spread over the U.S. rate) on its 
trend estimated by the Hodrick–Prescott filter and control variables. The control 
variables capture the effects from monetary policy (i.e., the central bank’s policy 
interest rate differential over the US rate), development of the banking sector (i.e., the 
banks’ assets to GDP), and governmental activity (i.e., the ratio of credit to the public 
sector to GDP). 
3 
The W-shock is defined as the annual percentage change in total factor productivity. In 
practice, productivity shocks can be created by various factors. For example, many 
Japanese multinationals are investing in Asia (Tajika and Nakatani, 2008), and foreign 
direct investment affects productivity dynamics in the region (Nakatani et al, 2017). 
4 
The deviation of real per capita GDP growth in a country from its average in the five 
preceding years. 
5 
The number of sample countries decreased slightly from 51 in Nakatani (2017b) to 49 
in this paper because we included an additional fiscal variable to control for the effects 
of fiscal policy on output. 
 31 
6 
If a monthly real exchange rate variable is missing in this database, the data are taken 
from the Bank for International Settlement’s monthly real exchange rates. 
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